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Omissions in the Charge to the Jury as
Reversible Error When Not Called to
the Attention of the Trial Court
Because of the complexities of the issues involved in many
cases tried before juries, the charges of trial courts are a prolific
source of reversals in the appellate courts. An understanding of
present Ohio law upon this topic must of necessity be obtained from
the evolving history of statutory and case law pertaining to the
charge to the jury. The current statute in civil cases provides that,
"When the evidence is concluded, either party may present -written
instructions to the court on matters of law, and request them to be
given to the jury, which instructions shall be given or refused
by the court before the argument to the jury is commenced."' The
right is thereby conferred upon the parties in civil cases to have
such written instructions as may be requested given to the jury
before argument.2 Refusal to give correct instructions before
argument is not cured by giving the substance of requested instruc-
tions in the general charge.3 In criminal cases, however, the right
to have requested instructions given before argument is discretion-
ary and not mandatory4 although if the requested instructions
are proper they should be incorporated in the general charge.5
As to the general charge, the statutes provide that, "The court,
after the argument is concluded, before proceeding with other
business shall charge the jury . . .- 6 Therefore, in view of the
unqualified right of the parties to present written instructions
before argument and the right to predicate error upon the refusal of
the court to give such instructions in civil cases, or its refusal to
incorporate them in its general charge in criminal cases, the only
omissions which must be considered here are those which occur
in the general charge given after the arguments of counsel
are concluded.
Previous to the enactment of any statute upon the subject of
the charge in Ohio it was said by the supreme court that, no rule
of law exists which requires a court, of its own volition to instruct
or charge a jury at all, it being only customary for our courts
1 Omo Gmx. CODE § 11420-1 (5).2 Monroevrle v. Root, 54 Ohio St. 523, 44 N.E. 237 (1896).
3 Lima Used Car Exchange Co. v. Hemperly, 120 Ohio St. 400, 166 N.E.
364 (1929).
4 State v. Cheatwood, 84 Ohio App. 125, 82 N.E. 2d 770 (1948).
S Grossweiler v. State, 113 Ohio St. 46, 148 N.E. 89 (1925); State v. Sanders,
68 Ohio App. 419, 41 NME. 2d 713 (1940).
G Omo GEN. CODE §§ 11420-1 (7), 13442-8 (7).
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to do so. 7 Likewise it was formerly impossible to claim that error
existed in a charge without having taken proper exception to the
charge as given.8 To the charge of the court, or the refusal to charge
when requested, it was necessary that the exception appear or no
ground would be shown by the record to justify a reversal of the
judgment.9 The object of the exception was, generally, to call the
attention of the trial court to the precise point of the claimed error,
so that the court could consider it and give other and different
instructions if it felt it had erred.'0 The exception also served to
bring upon the record for review a decision of the court upon
a matter of law which the record would not otherwise show and
therefore it was necessary that the exception be reduced to writing
and be allowed and signed by the court." Where no error appeared
in the record, it was sometimes necessary that the court look ex-
clusively to the bill of exceptions for the history of the case.12 In
order that a judgment should be reversed for erroneous instructions,
it was necessary that the instructions be material to the case,13
prejudicial to the complaining party, 14 and that exceptions be taken
at the time of the errors complained of.' 5
Despite the apparent finality of these rules however, in the case
of Baker v. Pendergast16 it was decided that,
Where the overruling of a motion for a new trial is
assigned for error, and all the evidence offered on the trial,
together with the charge of the court, is properly brought
up by bill of exceptions, a reviewing court will, in con-
nection with the evidence, look to the charge of the court,
whether excepted to or not; and if there is reason to believe
that the verdict was the result of erroneous instructions,
will reverse the judgment and award a new trial.
Thus a special exception to the charge was not in all cases necessary
before a reviewing court could find reversible error.17 If the error
of law, occurring at the trial, was such as to make the verdict
contrary to law, a new trial would be granted, though no exception
7 Jones v. State, 20 Ohio 34 (1851), accord, Taft v. Wildman, 15 Ohio 123
(1846).
8 Omo Gmx. CODS § 5298 as amended April 25, 1898; 93 Ohio Laws 299.
9 Geauga Iron Co. v. Street, 19 Ohio 300 (1850).
10 Western Insurance Co. v. Tobin, 32 Ohio St. 77 (1877).
11 Commercial Bank of Cincinnati v. Buckingham, 12 Ohio St. 402 (1861).
12 Creed v. Commercial Bank of Cincinnati, 11 Ohio 489 (1842).
13 Kugler v. Wiseman and Borchelt, 20 Ohio 361 (1851); Loudenback v.
Collins, 4 Ohio St. 251 (1854).
14Kugler v. Wiseman and Borchelt, supra note 13; Crickett v. State, 18
Ohio St. 9 (1868).
15 Little Miami Railroad Co. v. Washburn, 22 Ohio St. 324 (1872).
1632 Ohio St. 494 (1877); accord, Railroad Co. v. Fitzpatrick, 42 Ohio St.
318 (1884).
17 Weybright v. Fleming, 40 Ohio St. 52 (1883).
[Vol. 11
COMMENTS
was taken to the ruling of the court.' 8 Where the charge of the court
was manifestly erroneous as to a material issue raised by the de-
fense, the judgment would be reversed although it did not appear
that the defendant was prejudiced thereby.' 9
Aside from the problem of exceptions to the errors complained
of in the charge, additional rules were formulated as to what
constituted reversible error. The omission of a court in its charge
to define or explain doubtful words or phrases in a statute upon
which the action was founded was held not to constitute a ground
for reversal unless such definition or explanation was requested
by the complaining party.20 Where the charge was correct so far as
it went, but the court's attention was not called to an omitted
proposition of law involved in the case, the omission was not
reversible error even though a general exception was taken to the
charge, providing that the jury was not misled.2'I A similar rule
was applied in criminal cases. The court in Adams v. State2 2 said,
"When exceptions are taken to a general charge given by the
court to the jury, unless the party excepting points out specifically
the part or propositions of the charge excepted to, or the grounds
of the exception, a reviewing court is not bound to take notice
of the exception."
A charge in which the court failed to define clearly the kinds
of damages for which defendants were jointly liable wmas held not
reversible for mere indefiniteness where the verdict was supported
by the evidence and no further charge was requested.23 However,
a charge which consisted mainly of extracts from reported cases
or abstract propositions of law which had no special reference
to the circumstances of the case at bar was held objectionable;
and, where the jury may have been misled, a new trial was
granted.2 4 It has been said that, "A charge to the jury should be a
plain, distinct, and unambiguous statement of the law as applicable
to the case made before the jury by the proofs, and not mere
abstract legal rules."2  When a court erred in failing to charge on
Is Mowry v. Kirk and Cheever, 19 Ohio St. 375 (1869).
19 Jones v. Bangs, 40 Ohio St. 139 (1883).
20 Schneider v. Hosier, 21 Ohio St 98 (1871).
21 Schryver v. Hawkes and Bierce, 22 Ohio St. 308 (1872); Smith v. Pitts-
burg, Ft. Wayne & Chicago Ry., 23 Ohio St. 10 (1872); Rolling Mill Co. v.
Corrigan, 46 Ohio St. 283, 20 N.E. 466 (1899).
22 25 Ohio St. 584 (1874); accord, Doll v. State, 45 Ohio St. 445, 15 N.E. 293
(1837).
23PRailway Co. v. Hambleton, 40 Ohio St. 496 (1884); Railway Co. v.
Murphy, 50 Ohio St. 135, 33 N.E. 403 (1893).
24 Railroad Co. v. Picksley, 24 Ohio St. 654 (1874); Coal Co. v. Estievenard,
53 Ohio St. 43, 40 N.E. 725 (1894).25 Parmlee v. Adolph, 28 Ohio St. 10 (1875).
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an issue and an incorrect charge on such issue was requested, it
was not error for the court to refuse to give the charge requested,
but the attention of the court having been directed to the issue
in question, the refusal to charge correctly was not merely mislead-
ing but erroneous. 26
The decisions of the early Ohio cases would therefore appear
to establish these general propositions: (1) A judgment would
not be reversed for errors in the charge which were not material
or prejudicial. (2) Errors in the charge, to be considered by a
reviewing court, must have been shown by the record. (3) Ex-
ceptions to specific parts of the charge or requests for further
instructions upon particular issues were generally essential, but
there were certain situations in which such exceptions or requests
became unnecessary by reason of the manifiest error apparent in
the record.
In 1898 the statute pertaining to exceptions was amended to
read as follows: "A general exception taken to any charge of any
court to a jury, shall apply to any and all errors of law which exist
in such charge that are material and prejudicial to the substantial
rights of the party excepting.12 7 This was the existing law of the
state at the time of the holdings in two leading cases which have
established the outer limits with respect to the duty of the court
and the duty of counsel regarding omissions in the charge. Within
these outer limits the subsequent Ohio cases have been categorized
as more nearly representing one or the other of the two views.
The first of the two cases, Columbus Railway Co. v. Ritter,28 was
an action for negligence in which the issues were not complex. The
trial apparently proceeded so smoothly that the court gave but a
very brief charge to the jury. No further charge was requested
by counsel although a general exception was taken to the charge
as a whole. The supreme court, recognizing both the existence
of the duty of the trial court and the duty of counsel, held that
although the charge was incomplete, it contained no prejudicial
errors. Inasmuch as no further instructions were requested by the
complaining party and the charge as given did not mislead the jury,
there was no ground for a reversal of the judgment. The court
clearly held that a general exception to the charge of the trial
court does not bring into review on error an omission in the charge.
The Ritter case has been followed in criminal cases29 and in many
other cases too numerous to require citation here.
The second of the two leading cases, that of Baltimore & Ohio
26 Kirchner v. Myers, 35 Ohio St. 85 (1878).2 7 OHio Gx. CODE § 5298 as amended April 25, 1898.
28 67 Ohio St. 53, 65 N.E. 613 (1902).
29 State v. McCoy, 88 Ohio St. 447, 103 NXE. 136 (1913).
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Railway Co. v. Lockwood,30 was decided three years after the Ritter
case. It too was an action to recover damages for personal injuries
allegedly resulting from the defendant's negligence. Here the
trial court failed to charge the jury upon the specific issues of
fact as made up by the pleadings. The supreme court held that,
It is the duty of the trial court to separate and definitely
state to the jury, the issues of fact made in the pleadings,
accompanied by such instructions as to each issue as the
nabure of the case may require; and it is also the duty
of the court to distinguish between, and call the attention
of the jury to, the material allegations of fact which are
admitted and those which are denied.
From the decisions in the Ritter and Lockwood cases it becomes
apparent that the nature of the omission complained of may well
be indicative of the result which will be reached on appeal. It is
therefore necessary to examine the holdings in subsequent cases
to determine how the courts have treated the various omissions for
which error is claimed.
It was not error to omit to give an instruction to direct a
verdict for the party against whom a verdict was returned and judg-
ment rendered where such party failed to request such an instruc-
tion be given, since error consists not in the failure, but in the
refusal to give an instruction to which a party is entitled.3 ' A
general exception to the charge did not go to omitted matters
unless such omission rendered the charge misleading,32 but when
the court did not state the issues and merely said that each party
complained of the negligence of the other, the charge was mislead-
ing.33
In State v. McCoy 34 the trial court omitted to charge the jury
that t could find the defendant not guilty of a certain offense but
guilty of a certain included offense of an inferior degree. The circuit
court on appeal held the charge as given was misleading but the
supreme court reversed since the court correctly charged on the
greater offense and the jury found the defendant guilty. Looking
to the duty of counsel the supreme court has said:
The law imposes upon every litigant the duty of vigilance
in the trial of a case, and even where the trial court com-
mits an error to his prejudice, he is required then and there
to challenge the attention of the court to that error, by
excepting thereto, and upon failure of the court to correct
30 72 Ohio St. 586, 74 NE. 1071 (1905).
3 1 Whitaker v. Michigan Mutual Life Ins. Co., 77 Ohio St. 518, 83 N.E.
899 (1903).
32 Morgenroth v. The Northern Ohio Traction & Light Co., 18 Ohio C.C.
(n.s.) 306 (1910).
3 3 Kelley v. The Ohio Traction Co., 24 Ohio App. 539, 157 N.E. 765 (1927).
34 See note 29 supra; accord: State v. Driscoll, 106 Ohio St. 33, 138 N.E.
376 (1922); Todor v. State, 113 Ohio St. 377, 149 N.E. 326 (1925).
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the same, to cause his exceptions to be noted. For much
graver reasons a litigant cannot be permitted either inten-
tionally or unintentionally to induce or mislead a court into
the commission of an error and then procure a reversal of
the judgment for an error for which he was actively re-
sponsible. 35
It was not error to confine the charge to the issues made by
the pleadings, although other evidence was introduced, since there
had been no amendment and no request to charge.3 6 Where a charge
was requested but no specific rule of law was formulated, it was
not error to omit to charge on the relation between a prior con-
viction for a felony and the credibility of the witness.3 7 But where
the trial court omitted to state clearly the rule for the determination
of future damages, such inaccuracy was prejudicial error.3 8 Where,
however, the court omitted to charge on the questions of the mea-
sure of damages30 or the minimization of damages through the
efforts of the plaintiff,40 such omissions were not reversible error
when not called to the attention of the court and particularly so
when the instructions were correct so far as they were given.
41
In the absence of an allegation of contributory negligence or a
request to charge thereon an omission to so charge was not prejudi-
cial although the evidence may have tended to establish contribu-
tory negligence.42 Failure to charge that clear and convincing evi-
dence was the highest degree of proof available in civil cases was
an omission and not reversible error when not called to the attention
of the court. 43 But where a court placed a greater burden of proof
than the law required upon one of the parties, substantial rights
of the litigants were thereby invaded, prejudice was presumed
and a general exception to the charge was sufficient to save the
error.4 4 A general exception does cover prejudicial errors of law
existing in the charge as given.4 5 If the charge was not excepted
35 State v. Kollar, 93 Ohio St. 89, 91, 112 N.E. 196 (1915); accord, State v.
Shaeffer, 96 Ohio St. 215, 117 N.E. 220 (1917).
36 Ely v. Borck, 7 Ohio App. 49 (1916).
37 Cincinnati Traction Co. v. Lied, 9 Ohio App. 156 (1917).
38 Toledo Railways & Light Co. v. Prus, 7 Ohio App. 412 (1917). Contra,
Hansen v. Goetz, 37 Ohio L. Abs. 112 (1942).
39 1Marion Savings Bank v. Harper, 34 Ohio App. 339, 171 N.E. 248 (1930).
40 Campbell v. Eddy, 27 Ohio App. 13, 160 N.. 640 (1927).
41 Northwestern Ohio Natural Gas Co. v. First Congregational Church,
126 Ohio St. 140, 184 N.E. 512 (1933).
42 City of Zanesville v. Goodrich, 14 Ohio App. 228 (1920).
43 Schulte v. Hagemeyer, 16 Ohio App. 1 (1922).
44 Cleveland Railway Co. v. Kozlowski, 128 Ohio St. 445, 191 N.E. 787
(1934).
45 McDonald v. Pennsylvania Railway Co., 105 Ohio St. 230, 136 N.E. 894




to, or further instructions asked, the court should consider the entire
record when the motion for a new trial was taken on the grounds
of error in the charge.46
An omission to charge on the subject of res ipsa loquitur where
the facts called for that doctrine was not error in the absence of a
request for such a charge. 47 Failure to charge that plaintiff, whose
wife was driving when a collision occurred, would not be barred by
his wife's negligence unless she was his agent, was not reversible
error where no further charge was requested and no exception was
taken to the charge as given.4s An omission in the charge of the court
could not be regarded as error, especially if the court asked counsel
if they wished any additional instructions on particular points and
the answer was in the negative.49 The assumption is always made
that the court would have charged correctly if the error had been
called to his attention 0 The court's failure to charge that pres-
entation of a note for payment to all of the makers was necessary
in order to charge an indorser, was not a mere omission, but under
the circumstances was a clear failure to charge upon a very im-
portant issue, and clearly prejudicial.51 Where a special verdict
was to be rendered it was held even more important that the issue
be clearly defined.52 In the absence of a request, the failure of
the court to charge on the question of corroboration was no more
than an omission with respect to which counsel should not have
sat idly by and failed to call to the attention of the court.5 3
It would seem that the existence of the duty of the court and
the duty of counsel is the underlying reason for the decisions in
the cases discussed. Where the omission in the charge is of a
minor nature it is the duty of counsel to call the attention of the
court to the omission as in Columbus Railway Co. v. Ritter. Where,
however, the omission becomes one of such a serious nature that
the issues are not separately stated to the jury, as in Baltimore
& Ohio Railway Co. v. Lockwood then it is the court which has failed
in its duty. This distinction is discernible in those cases in which the
courts could clearly classify the nature of the omission. The language
in the cases indicates that errors in the charge are classified as
4 6 Cox v. Waltz, 13 Ohio L. Abs. 364 (1932).
47 Beeler v. Ponting, 116 Ohio St. 432, 156 N.E. 599 (1927); Walker v.
Toledo Hotel Co., 59 Ohio App. 229, 17 N.E. 2d 422 (1938).
4S Burkhart v. Hancock, 25 Ohio App. 183, 158 N.E. 497 (1926).
49 Davis v. State, 26 Ohio App. 340, 159 N.E. 575 (1927); Winterbottom-
Connelly Co. v. Butler, 11 Ohio L. Abs. 521 (1931); Iles v. Industrial Comnis-
sion, 37 Ohio L. Abs. 309 (1942).
s0 Ohio Oil Co. v. Liles, 54 Ohio App. 124, 6 N.E. 2d 18 (1935).
Sl Wehnes v. Schiiewe, 47 Ohio App. 452, 192 N.E. 12 (1934).
S2 Gendler v. Cleveland Railway Co., 18 Ohio App. 48 (1924).
53 State v. Sweet, 26 Ohio L Abs. 523 (1937).
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to errors of omission and errors of commission. Those errors which
the duty of counsel requires be called to the attention of the court in
order to claim successfully that error existed in the charge have
been called errors of omission. The more serious errors pertaining
to those elements of the charge which it is the duty of the court
to give correctly, and to which a general exception was sufficient
to save the error, have been called errors of commission. Unfortu-
nately, however, there are some cases in which it is very difficult
to determine whether the errors complaind of are errors of omission
or errors of commission. This difficulty was recognized in Telinde
v. The Ohio Traction Co.5 4 Here the plaintiff pleaded negligence
which was denied by the defendant who in turn pleaded contribu-
tory negligence. The evidence tended to show both negligence and
contributory negligence. A judgment was rendered for the plaintiff
which was reversed by the court of appeals because of errors in
the charge in failing to define negligence and contributory negli-
gence. The supreme court affirmed the decision of the court
of appeals on the authority of the Lockwood case. In the opinion
Chief Justice Marshall also referred to the Ritter case and dis-
cussed the duties placed upon the court and counsel by the two
cases. The opinion contains this significant statement:
As between the responsibility resting upon the court on
the one hand, and that resting on counsel on the other, it is
apparent that cases will constantly arise for which no def-
inite rule can be established. It is not intended in this case
to modify or in the least detract from any statements in any
of the reported cases dealing with the relative duties of
court and counsel. The problem is not always solved, how-
ever, by merely determining whether the blame rests upon
the court or upon counsel. It may be that both are at fault,
and when in such case error intervenes which is material
and prejudicial to the substantial rights of the Dartv ex-
cepting, what course should be pursued by a reviewing
court? Substantial justice to the litigant should be the
highest aim of the courts, otherwise the Bill of Rights be-
comes only a form. In spite of the rules already laid down
and those which may hereafter be declared, it is manifest
that there will yet remain a twilight zone in which cases
will appear where the courts will be compelled to deter-
mine upon the particular issues of those cases, and the evi-
dence adduced in support thereof, whether instructions
amount to a charge complying with Section 11447, and, if
not, whether it was the duty of counsel to make specific
objections and requests for further instructions.
Following the Telinde case there are several cases which
admirably reveal the difficulty experienced by the courts in classi-
fying errors as omissions or commissions. In Cleveland Railway Co.
54 109 Ohio St. 125, 141 N.E. 673 (1923).
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v. McCoyG the court, after much discussion, concluded that an in-
complete charge on contributory negligence was an error of com-
mission not omission. Ten years later however, failure to charge
on the contributory negligence of a beneficiary in a wrongful death
action was held, by the majority of the reviewing court, to be an
error of omission while one judge, although concurring in the
result, felt that it was an error of commission.56 In a will contest
case in which the trial court did not mention the codicil in the
charge to the jury the majority of the reviewing court held the
error was one of omission. The dissenting judge, who regarded the
error as highly prejudicial, classified it as an error of commission.57
Judge Matthews, dissenting in State v. Hobbs,5s held that a defi-
nition which omitted the mental attitude required by the statute in
defining the crime was an error of commission which was pre-
judicial.
In 1936 an important statutory change was made on the subject
of the charge. The general exception to the charge of the court
was abolished.59 With respect to the charge the new provision, which
is the law at the present time, provides that, "Error can be pre-
dicated upon erroneous statements contained in the charge, not
induced by the complaining party, without exception being taken
to the charge-"60
It is obvious that this statute eliminates the problem of whether
a general exception to the charge is sufficient to call the particular
error to the attention of the reviewing court. It has not, however,
solved the problem of defining the duty of the court and the duty of
counsel. The same classification as to errors of omission and errors
of commission appears in the cases.
In Simko v. Miller"' the supreme court was called upon to
consider alleged errors in the charge of a court in an action for
negligence in which contributory negligence was made an issue. It
was held that the new code provision, under which the case was
decided, did not change the rule that errors of commission need not
be excepted to generally, while errors of omission must be called
to the attention of the court specifically. The court discussed the
Lockwood and the Ritter cases and found that the charge given was
bad by reason of errors and omissions which were highly prejudicial
under the doctrine of the Lockwood case. The usual distinction was
55 28 Ohio App. 318, 162 N.E. 699 (1927).
56 Nunn v. Davidson, 55 Ohio App. 297, 9 N.E. 2d 732 (1937).
57 Adams v. Foley, 36 Ohio App. 295, 173 N.E. 197 (1929).
5S 59 Ohio App. 274, 17 N.E. 2d 937 (1937).
59 Omo GEN. CODE § 11561. Repealed effective Jan. 1, 1936, 116 Ohio Laws
304.
60 OHIo GEN. CODE § 11560. Effective Jan. 1, 1936.
61 133 Ohio St. 345, 13 N.E. 2d 914 (1938).
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made between errors of omission and errors of commission, however
it would seem that the result reached was based both on the
omissions and the errors existing in the charge as given. The case
aptly illustrates the difficulty in classifying errors in the charge
by this method.
Some of the more recent Ohio cases decided under the present
statute contain similar language. Failure to instruct as to the effect
of a prior inconsistent statement, used when the party calling the
witness has been surprised by his testimony, was said to be an in-
advertant omission rather than an error of commission, and hence
not reversible since not called to the attention of the court.62 Failure
to define the words "prima facie" used in the charge was not pre-
judicial error when there was no request to do so.0 3 In Karr v.
Sixt64 the trial court had failed to charge completely as to the
beneficiaries in a wrongful death action. No additional instructions
were asked but a general exception was taken to the charge. The
majority of the court held that the error was one of omission, and
that the general exception presented for review only questions
as to errors of law existing in the charge as given, which was not
confusing and misleading as far as it went. Judges Matthias and
Hart dissented on the ground that the incompleteness of the charge
rendered it misleading and therefore prejudicially erroneous.
In Portney v. Frank65 it was held that the statute abolishing
the general exception to the charge does not change the duty of
counsel to call the attention of the court to any omission in a charge
unless the jury was misled by the charge as given. HB the charge as
given is correct and not misleading, unless the omission is called
to the attention of the court and such other instructions are speci-
fically presented and refused there is no reversible error.6 6 Whether
a charge is misleading must be determined by the charge as given,
keeping in view the issues made and the evidence presented.67 A
charge which directs the jury that it may accept as true admissions
contained in the pleadings, without stating that this applies only to
the party making the admissions, will not be deemed prejudical
where no attempt is made to have the charge corrected.68
From the review of the decisions considered it is apparent that
62 State v. Daffy, 134 Ohio St. 16, 15 N.E. 2d 535 (1938).
63 Smith v. Zone Cabs, 135 Ohio St. 415, 21 N.E. 2d 336 (1939).
64146 Ohio St. 527, 67 N.E. 2d 331 (1946).
65 77 Ohio App. 357, 65 N.E. 2d 290 (1946).
66 Hubbard v. Cleveland, C. & C. Highway, Inc., 81 Ohio App. 445, 76 N.E.
2d 721 (1947); State v. Grambo, 82 Ohio App. 473, 75 N.E. 2d 826 (1947); Bach-
man v. Ambos, 83 Ohio App. 141, 79 N.E. 2d 177 (1947).67Kleinhans v. The American Gauge Co., 83 Ohio App. 453, 80 N.E. 2d
626 (1948).
68Place v. Elliott, 147 Ohio St. 499, 72 N.E. 2d 103 (1947).
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Ohio courts fully recognize the existence of the duty of the trial
court and the duty of counsel. It is submitted however, that the
distinction made between errors of omission and errors of commis-
sion is of little assistance in classiflying the errors in a charge. The
distinction is one of degree, rather than one of kind as the words
would seem to imply. It is obvious that an omission in a charge
can become so manifestly erroneous and prejudicial as to be clas-
sified as an error of commission. The problem is one of determining
the effect of the omission. If the charge as given is misleading the
decision should be reversed. On the other hand, if the omission was
one which would have been corrected if requested by counsel, but
which as given was not prejudicially erroneous, the decision should
not be reversed merely because counsel failed in their duty to call
the omission tc the attention of the court. Since it is the effect of the
omission rather than the type of omission which is important,
little is to be gained by denominating the error one of omission or
one of commission.
Allen H. Bechtel
